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1. INTRODUCTION
Denying precedential status to unpublished opinions muddles the
already unclear law surrounding qualified immunity. Qualified immu-
nity is a defense available to government officials accused of civil rights
violations.' In fact, it is the most significant and most problematic
defense to such claims.2 By varying in their treatment of unpublished
opinions, particularly on the issue of precedent, the federal circuits have
added another layer of uncertainty and inequality to this analysis.' The
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
Professor Cleveland would like to express his gratitude to Jamie Cohen for her outstanding
research assistance.
1. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials performing
discretionary functions[ ] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.").
2. MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT §§ 2:14, 3:3 (3d ed. 2009) (noting various
complexities in both the substantive qualified immunity test and the procedural issues in bringing
such claims); lA MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 9A.01[A] (2009)
("Qualified immunity is the most common immunity defense asserted in actions brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.").
3. Compare D.C. CIR. R. 32.1 (stating that unpublished opinions issued after January 1,
45
46 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:45
Supreme Court has aptly cautioned in another context that "[1]iberty
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."' The federal circuits' non-
uniform practices regarding the precedential status of unpublished opin-
ions has increasingly fostered a jurisprudence of doubt. The effect on the
qualified immunity analysis is one concrete example of this doubt. This
uncertainty should be removed either by granting these opinions prece-
dential status or by recognizing their value in the qualified immunity
analysis.
Individuals who have their civil rights violated by state government
officials have a right to bring a suit in federal court for relief.' The fed-
eral statute creating that right, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was
drafted to give effect to the recently passed Fourteenth Amendment and
to provide an avenue to enforce federal civil rights even in the face of
discriminatory state laws, state law enforcement apathy, or state court
procedural barriers.' The statute allows an injured person to make a
claim against the person who injured that person directly, avoiding the
sovereign immunity claim that would likely bar a claim against the state
government itself. It has since been used to seek redress for the violation
of a wide variety of federal rights.' A similar cause of action against
federal government officials was recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown
2002 may be cited "as precedent") with 9H CIR. R. 36-3 (stating, with very limited exceptions,
that unpublished opinions have no precedential value).
4. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (creating a right to bring suit to enforce constitutional or
statutory rights); see also SWORD AND SHIELD: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983
LrIGATION 4-5 (Mary Massaron Ross & Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter
SWORD AND SHIELD].
6. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
7. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 503-04 (2005) (Equal Protection right to be free
from racial discrimination); Devenpeck v. Alford, 553 U.S. 146, 151 (2004) (Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 735 (2002)
(Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Dennis v. Higgins, 498
U.S. 439, 451 (1991) (right to bring an action under the Dormant Commerce Clause); Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) (Fourth Amendment right to be free from deadly force in the
apprehension of an unarmed, fleeing, suspected felon); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 536 (1985) (discharge or demotion in government employment without procedural due
process); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 44 (1984) (discrimination in public employment based
on race or the exercise of First Amendment rights); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 520 (1984)
(Fifth Amendment takings); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523-24 (1979) (substantive due
process right to be free of punishment prior to conviction); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977) (retaliation for exercise of First Amendment right to
free speech); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 654 (1977) (use of corporal punishment in public
schools); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976) (deliberate indifference to the medical needs
of prison inmates); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (Substantive Due Process
freedom from government conduct that "shocks the conscience"); McKinley v. City of Mansfield,
404 F.3d 418, 422 (6th Cir. 2005) (Fifth Amendment right to freedom from self-incrimination);
see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 274-75 n.31 (1985) (collecting other civil rights contexts
in which section 1983 was used to vindicate federal rights).
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Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.' These actions are very
similar, and in regard to the qualified immunity defense, they are
identical.'
A government official may raise the defense of qualified immunity
in these civil rights actions if the official's actions do not violate a
"clearly established" right.' 0 That is, whether the official violated a fed-
eral right and whether that right was clearly established at the time."
This type of "good faith" immunity from suit for official acts is a vener-
able one,12 but its exact contours under federal law were arrived at much
more recently.13 For example, the question of whether the official's sub-
jective good faith was relevant was decided in 1982,'4 and the level of
factual similarity needed to clearly establish the law was clarified as
recently as 2004.15 The application of the qualified immunity defense
8. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
9. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1998) ("[T]he qualified immunity analysis is
identical under either cause of action.").
10. Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,
563-64 (2004); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam); Hope, 536 U.S. at
739-41; Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-03 (2001); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
587-88 (1998); Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
227 (1991); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
639 (1987); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Some governmental officials are
entitled to absolute immunity, such as legislators, judges, and prosecutors acting within their
traditional official roles. The Supreme Court has taken a functional and very restrictive approach
to both deciding who is included in these classes and what activities are traditionally covered by
absolute immunity. Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 223-24 (1988); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-44 (1986); see also SWORD AND
SHIELD, supra note 5, at 444-45 (describing the Supreme Court's "functional approach in
determining whether a particular class .. . is entitled to assert an absolute immunity or qualified
immunity defense").
11. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
12. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316-17 n.8 (1975); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376 (1951) (noting that governmental immunity was a "tradition so well grounded in history
and reason" as early as 1871).
13. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 (requiring only objective good faith and thus rejecting former
additional requirement of subjective good faith on the part of the defendant asserting immunity);
Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-41 (requiring a level of prior notice of the right between abstract
formulation and precisely analogous facts).
14. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 (requiring only objective good faith and thus rejecting former
additional requirement of subjective good faith on the part of the defendant asserting immunity).
15. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that existing cases
did not have the requisite factual similarity to the case at bar and demonstrating that the area "is
one in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case"). Similarly, as recently as
2009, the Court altered the test by abandoning a prior decision that required courts to take the
qualified immunity questions of constitutional violation and clearly established right in that order.
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (departing from a prior ruling in Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001) and holding that courts were free to address the allegation of a constitutional
injury or the issue of whether the law was clearly established first as they saw fit). Commentators
and Justices alike have tended to view the issue of qualified immunity as a threshold issue that
should be addressed before proceeding to the constitutional determination. See generally Los
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
remains a challenging one. For example, in each case the court must
determine whether the law was clearly established sufficiently to put the
officer on notice of the illegality of the action.16 Though the Supreme
Court has frequently clarified the level of factual similarity between pre-
cedent cases and the alleged violation necessary to clearly establish the
law, circuit courts have continued to announce varying formulations of
how fact-specific the precedent must be." Determining in a given case
whether the right is so "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that [his conduct] violates that right" has proven difficult to
administer.'"
However, an even more fundamental ambiguity exists that muddles
the qualified immunity analysis. Qualified immunity turns on a determi-
nation of what law is clearly established at the time of the incident.
Before one can know what the law is, one must know what sources can
supply that law. In the qualified immunity context, the sources that can
be used to determine clearly established law have never been settled
upon.'I The Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald set forth the modern
test for qualified immunity, which focuses on whether the law was
clearly established, but it left unresolved the issue of what sources of
law can serve to clearly establish the law.2 0 The Court has declined to
give any explicit guidance on what sources inform determinations of
Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 616-17 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (similarly
rejecting the Saucier analysis as an "unwise practice of deciding constitutional questions in
advance of the necessity of doing so"); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201 (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Scalia, in their joint concurring opinion, expressed concern that requiring courts to address
constitutional injury before qualified immunity "requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult
constitutional questions when there is available an easier basis for the decision (e.g., qualified
immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case"); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275, 1279 (2006) (citations omitted)
(calling Saucier's "rigid 'order of battle"' a "puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum").
16. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
17. Within the confines of the Supreme Court rulings, circuit courts have taken expansive,
moderate, and restrictive views on what level of similarity must exist. Compare Brokaw v. Mercer
Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that even in the absence of any prior
analogous case-law a clearly established right may exist where a reasonable person would know
of the right and of the unconstitutionality of the conduct at issue) with Burton v. Richmond, 276
F.3d 973, 976 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying a "flexible standard, requiring some, but not precise
factual correspondence" (quoting J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1989))) and
Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 954 (1Ith Cir. 2003) ("preexisting caselaw that
has applied general law to specific circumstances will almost always be necessary").
18. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also AVERY ET AL., supra note 2, at
§ 2:14 (noting various complexities in both the substantive qualified immunity test and the
procedural issues in bringing such claims); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at § 9A.01[A] ("Qualified
immunity is the most common immunity defense asserted in actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.").
19. MARK R. BROWN & Krr KINPORTS, CONST-UnONAL LMGATION UNDER § 1983, at
109-10 (2d ed. 2008).
20. Id.
48 [Vol. 65:45
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clearly established law. 2' So, while the Supreme Court has referenced
lower court decisions in discussing subsequent qualified immunity
cases, it has not established whether and to what extent decisions other
than its own can clearly establish the law.22 Circuit courts have varying
standards for what decisions can clearly establish the law, 2 3 and in par-
ticular, circuit courts are split on whether unpublished opinions may be
used to clearly establish the law.24
Though unpublished opinions are plainly decisions of a common
law court, traditionally accorded precedential value since the birth of the
common law, the federal courts since the mid-1970s have unreflectively
relegated them to precedential limbo.2 5 Many arguments have been mar-
shaled against the practice of denying precedent to unpublished deci-
sions, 2 and a recent amendment to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure has acknowledged the value of citing these decisions. 2 7 How-
21. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32 ("[W]e need not define here the circumstances under which
'the state of the law' should be 'evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts
of Appeals, or of the local District Court.'" (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565
(1977))).
22. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 533-35 (1985) (suggesting that two district
court cases approving of certain conduct did not clearly establish the law); Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603, 616-17 (1999) (noting that a state appellate decision, two unpublished opinions, and
recently decided circuit opinion failed to clearly establish the law in the absence of controlling
authority or a consensus of persuasive authority).
23. Compare Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 714 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "[a]bsent
binding precedent, we look to all available decisional law, including the law of other circuits and
district courts, to determine whether the right was clearly established" (quoting Osolinski v. Kane,
92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1996))) with Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1032-33 n.10 (11th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the law can be "clearly establish[ed]" only by decision of the Supreme
Court, Eleventh Circuit, or highest state court of the relevant state and rejecting that a "consensus
of cases of persuasive authority" may clearly establish the law).
24. Compare Carver v. Lehman, 550 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir. 2008), amended by 558 F.3d
869 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that unpublished opinions have long been acceptable sources for
determining whether the law is clearly established and that even those whose citation is not
explicitly permitted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 may be cited to establish or
refute a claim that the law was clearly established) with Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th
Cir. 1996) (stating that unpublished opinions are not precedential and cannot be considered in
deciding whether particular conduct violated clearly established law for purposes of qualified
immunity). The pre-amended version of Carver has been withdrawn from publication.
25. David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning
Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 61, 84-90 (2009). The word
"unreflective," though harsh, is justified by the 1973 Committee's intentional refusal to consider
the propriety of its sub silentio denial of precedent to some opinions, viewing it as a "morass of
jurisprudence." See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APP. JUSTICE, COMM. ON USE OF APP. CT. ENERGIES,
STANDARDS FOR PUBL'N OF JUDICIAL OrNIONS: A REPORT OF THE COMM. ON USE OF APP. CT.
ENERGIES OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APP. JUSTICE, 20-21 (1973) [hereinafter STANDARDS
FOR PUBLICATION]. In addition, the adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1
continues this practice of avoiding the crucial question. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 cmt.
26. Cleveland, supra note 25, at 106-73.
27. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (permitting citation of unpublished opinions issued on or after
January 1, 2007).
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ever, the precedential value of these decisions remains uncertain.2 8 This
ambiguity has a direct and dire effect on the qualified immunity analy-
sis. The inclusion or exclusion of unpublished opinions as evidence of
clearly established law may alter the "contours of the right" and the
clarity with which an official would understand that the right has been
violated.2 9 Yet, this is exactly the state of the law. Some circuits
acknowledge that these decisions are part of the body of law that speak
to the establishment of a right while others choose to overlook these
decisions and focus only on published authorities."o Still other circuits
have not established any clear rule regarding the use of unpublished
31opinions.
This differing treatment of unpublished opinions as a source of law
in the qualified immunity analysis injects unnecessary uncertainty into
an already complicated legal analysis. Given the importance of both pro-
tecting the constitutional rights of those injured at the hands of govern-
ment officials and protecting government officials acting in good faith
from needless litigation,32 a clear rule on the status of unpublished opin-
ions as sources of law should be established. Granting unpublished
decisions precedential status would elevate them to their rightful place
as circuit court opinions to be used in the qualified immunity analysis.
But, even if that is not done, they should be accepted as among the best
evidence of what law is clearly established.
This article argues for uniform treatment of unpublished opinions
28. Compare D.C. CIR. R. 32.1 (stating that unpublished opinions issued only by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals on or after January 1, 2002, and all unpublished opinions issued on or
after January 1, 2007, may be cited for precedential value) with 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (stating that
unpublished opinions have no precedential value except for purposes of claim or issue preclusion).
29. This test of the contours of the right and the clarity with which a government official
would know of his conduct's unlawfulness is the qualified immunity inquiry as enunciated in
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
30. See supra note 25.
31. The First, Fifth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have not addressed the issue of whether
unpublished opinions may be considered in clearly establishing the law.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-21 (1975)
(suggesting a need to protect school board members acting in good faith from liability "for every
action which is found subsequently have been violative of a student's constitutional rights");
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (discussing the rationales for qualified immunity for
judges and police officers). This law is commonly called "section 1983" and a claim for relief
under it a "section 1983 claim."
33. While this article confines itself to the issue of how unpublished opinions are used, a
Supreme Court ruling on exactly which sources may generally "clearly establish" the law would
create beneficial uniformity in an area of law-federal civil rights guarantees-where uniformity
is warranted, and simplify an already complicated legal standard. See Michael S. Catlett, Note,
Clearly Not Established: Decisional Lw and the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 47 ARIz. L. REV.
1031, 1055-62 (2005); Jonathan M. Stemerman, Unclearly Establishing Qualified Immunity:
What Sources of Authority May be Used to Determine Whether the Lw is "Clearly Established"
in the Third Circuit?, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1221, 1244-50 (2002).
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in the qualified immunity analysis because they are intrinsically evi-
dence of clearly established law. Part I of this article briefly discusses
the civil rights actions provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.3 4 Part II dis-
cusses the contours of the qualified immunity defense. Part III examines
the historical and current status of unpublished opinions, particularly in
regard to precedential status and their inherent nature as applications of
clearly established law. Part IV examines the varying laws of the federal
circuit courts of appeals regarding the use of unpublished opinions in the
qualified immunity analysis. Part V recommends the use of unpublished
opinions in the qualified immunity analysis either because they are pre-
cedent or because they are, by their very nature, evidence of clearly
established law.
II. CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
A person whose civil rights are violated by a government official
has a direct cause of action against that official.35 The Civil Rights Act
of 1871, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a plaintiff a direct
cause of action against a state or local government official who violates
the plaintiffs constitutional or statutorily granted rights:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
To obtain relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed under color of
state law.3 7 The initial purpose of this statute was tripartite. First, it
sought to override any state laws promoting invidious discrimination by
removing state government officials' ability to claim that discrimination
was part of their state law duties. Second, it provided a remedy for
constitutional injury to those whose state law remedy was inadequate or
34. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. This type of claim is commonly called
a "Bivens action" after this case, which first recognized such a cause of action.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 claims have also been permitted based on rights granted
under federal treaties. See Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991).
37. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 171 (1961); Catlett, supra note 33, at 1037.
38. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173.
2010] 51
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illusory, either because of the substance of state law or the procedural
barriers it created.39 Third, it created an enforcement mechanism for fed-
eral law that would function regardless of the states' unwillingness or
inability to enforce the law.4 0
A similar cause of action for claims against federal government
officials was recognized by the Supreme Court in Bivens: "[Previously,]
we reserved the question whether violation of that command by a federal
agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action
for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct. Today we
hold that it does." 4 ' In order to obtain relief under a Bivens action, a
plaintiff must prove that a federal official's actions infringed a right
guaranteed by the Constitution.4 2 The purpose of the Court's creation of
a Bivens action is to give individuals constitutionally injured by federal
officers a means of redress, regardless of whether the state law or
enforcement mechanism would provide such redress:
[A]s our cases make clear, the Fourth Amendment operates as a limi-
tation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether the
State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or
penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citizen. It guaran-
tees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal
authority. And "where federally protected rights have been invaded,
it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."4 3
Neither cause of action creates any federal right; they merely pro-
vide for a cause of action to enforce existing constitutional rights."
These actions have been used to assert violations of a wide variety of
constitutional4 5 and statutory rights.4 6 Common claims are for violations
39. Id. at 173-74.
40. Id. at 174.
41. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971).
42. Catlett, supra note 33, at 1037.
43. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
44. Section 1983 also permits a cause of action based on the violation of federal statutory
rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). A Bivens action seems limited to constitutional violations.
45. See cases cited surpra note 7.
46. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-87 (2002) (holding that any federal statute may
be enforced through section 1983 if it unambiguously creates a federal right but some statutes, like
the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, do not create enforceable rights); Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1980) (explaining that section 1983 permits actions for federal
statutes beyond the traditional "civil rights" protections including violation of rights granted by
the Social Security Act). Use of a section 1983 action to enforce statutory rights is relatively rare
because, to be enforceable through section 1983, the right must be: (1) unambiguously established
by Congress and (2) without a congressionally created enforcement mechanism. See BROWN &
KINPORTS, supra note 19, at 69-70.
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of the Fourth Amendment in the criminal law context, the Eighth
Amendment in the prison context, and for retaliation for the exercise of
First Amendment rights.47 The purpose of both section 1983 and Bivens
actions is to give parties injured by government officials acting under
the color of law an avenue to seek redress.48 However, to prevent gov-
ernment officials from having to defend frivolous lawsuits or those that
would chill government officials' good faith exercise of authority, both
section 1983 and Bivens actions are subject to the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity,4 9 and "the qualified immunity analysis is identical
under either cause of action.""o
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
While some government officials are entitled to absolute immunity
for certain official acts, all government officials 1 may claim qualified
immunity for conduct that "does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."5 2 This protection, formerly known as the "good faith" defense,
is well-established.53
The Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald set forth the modern
rule for qualified immunity: "[G]overnment officials performing discre-
tionary functions[ ] generally are shielded from liability for civil dam-
ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known."5 4 This provided an objective, reasonable official in the
defendant's position with a standard by which to judge the alleged con-
duct. Thus, the crux of the qualified immunity test is whether the law
47. SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 5, at 15-17.
48. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389; see also
SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 5, at 4-5.
49. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814-19; see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70
(2001) ("[Tlhe threat of litigation and liability will adequately deter federal officers for Bivens
purposes no matter that they may enjoy qualified immunity").
50. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394
n.9 (1989) and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n.2 (1986)).
51. In the Supreme Court alone, qualified immunity has been applied (if not actually granted)
to a variety of government officials that carry out executive or administrative government
functions. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733 (2002) (prison officials); Siegert v. Gilley, 500
U.S. 226, 227-29 (1991) (mental health officials); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637-39
(1987) (FBI agents); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 185 (1984) (state highway department
officials); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 309-11 (1975) (school officials); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 233-34 (1974) (inter alia the university president and national guard officials).
52. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
53. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 572-73 n.4 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This
'good-faith' analysis is a forebear of our modern doctrine of qualified immunity.").
54. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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was clearly established such that a reasonable official would have
known the conduct to be unlawful.
The Supreme Court has since clarified this standard as requiring
only that the unlawfulness of the official's acts be apparent and not
requiring prior case law be identical or materially similar. In Anderson v.
Creighton, the plaintiff sought damages from FBI agents for the war-
rantless search of his home in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights." The Court clarified that abrogating qualified immunity requires
not only that there is a relevant constitutional right in a general sense,
but that the contours of that right must be clear enough that a reasonable
official would understand that his actions will infringe it.56 Anderson
also held that identical actions need not have previously been held
unlawful, but "in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent."" In 2002, the Supreme Court again clarified that facts of
prior cases need not be "materially similar" 8 or "fundamentally simi-
lar" 9 to clearly establish the law. Even a total lack of precedent is not a
guarantee of qualified immunity if the conduct is patently unconstitu-
tional.60 That said, factual similarity of prior cases and the clarity of the
established law remains a key issue of dispute in qualified immunity
cases.61
Qualified immunity is intended to protect government officials who
act in good faith in carrying out their duties. The public interest in
awarding damages to vindicate constitutional rights must be tempered
because "claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the
guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a
whole."6 2 In its formulation of the modem qualified immunity test, the
Supreme Court in Harlow spelled out some of the social costs that mili-
tate in favor of a qualified immunity defense:
55. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 635.
56. Id. at 639-40.
57. Id. at 640. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this analysis in United States v. Lanier, 520
U.S. 259, 271 (1997).
58. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
59. Id. at 740 (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 263).
60. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564-65 (2004) (relying upon the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment itself as sufficiently establishing that defendant's conduct
was unconstitutional); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 ("This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful.").
61. See AVERY ET AL., supra note 2, at § 3:6 ("There is considerable disagreement among the
circuits as to how precisely the right must be defined in order to determine whether the right was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.").
62. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.
574, 590 (1998) ("[T]here is a strong public interest in protecting public officials from the costs
associated with the defense of damages actions.").
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These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of
official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able
citizens from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger
that fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinch-
ing discharge of their duties." 6 3
In addition, the lack of such a defense "would deter [an official's]
willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment
required by the public good."64 In sum, the public policy underlying
qualified immunity includes "attracting competent individuals to public
sector jobs, encouraging individuals to serve in elected offices, allowing
public officials to exercise unfettered discretion in serving the public
good, and avoiding exposing public officials to unnecessary litigation
that would distract them from their civic responsibilities."6 5
Qualified immunity is intended to be an immunity not only from
liability but from the suit itself.6 6 As the Supreme Court stated in Mitch-
ell v. Forsyth, qualified immunity provides "immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense to liability . . . ."67 For the most part, qualified
immunity should be determined early in the litigation to relieve officials
entitled to immunity from the burden of discovery and litigation.6 8 The
social costs that qualified immunity are intended to prevent, i.e., "the
general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial-distraction of
officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary
action, and deterrence of able people from public service,"69 are only
avoided if the determination is made before the defendant is put through
the time and expense of trial. Similarly, "Harlow emphasizes that even
such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as
'[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective govern-
ment."'"o Likewise, unlike most summary judgment rulings, which are
interlocutory and not immediately appealable, an order denying sum-
mary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is immediately
appealable.' Similarly, the Supreme Court recently held that trial
63. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
64. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 590 n.13 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40
(1974)).
65. SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 5, at 465.
66. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
67. Id. (alteration in original).
68. See Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Because qualified
immunity is effectively lost if a case is permitted to go to trial, 'it should be resolved as early as
possible."' (quoting Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2000))).
69. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982).
70. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (alteration in original) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817).
71. See id. at 530 ("[A] district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent
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courts' first step in analyzing a claim and defense of qualified immunity
may be to address either the question of whether a constitutional viola-
tion is alleged or whether the right was clearly established.7 2
The modem qualified immunity test shields government officials
from liability and suit where their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware.
This inquiry is an objective test, which turns on the objective legal rea-
sonableness of the defendant's actions assessed in light of the law that
was clearly established at the time of those actions.74 That is, whether a
reasonable official would have thought that the actions complained of
were reasonable (i.e., constitutional) and based on settled law at that
time. If reasonable officials could disagree, then the law is not clearly
established.7 6
The critical inquiry in the qualified immunity analysis is what law
was clearly established at the time the defendant official's action was
taken. This inquiry requires an examination of the case law, but which
cases may be used to determine whether the law is clearly established
varies between the circuits. If unpublished opinions are viewed as prece-
dent, they should be used on the same basis as any other circuit decision,
but even if they are not, the very characteristics that lead courts to issue
them as unpublished makes them ideal for determining the clearly estab-
lished law.
IV. UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
Unpublished opinions are not inherently non-precedential, and even
if treated as non-precedential, they are by definition evidence of clearly
established law. Whether unpublished opinions have precedent, as some
argue,77 they are undeniably evidence of clearly established law given
the publication standards in place in the circuits.
that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.").
72. See sources cited supra note 15.
73. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
74. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
75. See McCleary v. Navarro, 504 U.S. 966, 967 (1992); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228
(1991).
76. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228 ("Under settled law, [officers] are entitled to immunity if a
reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest [the suspect].").
77. See D.C. CIR. R. 32.1 ("All unpublished orders or judgments of this court .. . entered on
or after January 1, 2002, may be cited as precedent."); Cleveland, supra note 25, at 70-84.
78. Most circuits expressly require that an opinion establish a new rule or law or modify an
existing rule before publication is permitted. See, e.g., 4rH Cut. R. 36(a)(i) ("Opinions ... will be
published only if the opinion satisfies" one or more standards. One such standard is if an opinion
"establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law within [the Fourth] Circuit"); 5TH
ClR. R. 47.5.1(a) (requiring an opinion to be published if it "[e]stablishes a new rule of law, alters,
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Throughout English and American history, whether an opinion was
published was not determinative of its precedential value. That is, even
decisions that were difficult for litigants to find could still be brought to
a court's attention and urged as precedent laid down to be followed,
distinguished, or overruled." In the mid-1970s, however, to deal with
the growing volume of case law in the federal appellate courts, a com-
mittee of the federal judiciary created an odd distinction in federal cases
that had not been present in common law in England or America.80 That
distinction was that some cases would be published and citeable and
others would be unpublished and unciteable. This essentially created a
body of unpublished opinions' with traits (non-citeable and non-prece-
dent) unlike any in common law history." While the Committee's rec-
ommendation claimed to have dealt only with whether an unpublished
case could be cited as precedent and not whether it was precedent,8 3 this
was a distinction without a difference. The 1973 Committee plainly
or modifies an existing rule of law, or calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have
been generally overlooked"); 6TH CIR. R. 206(a)(1) (whether an opinion "establishes a new rule of
law, or alters or modifies an existing rule of law, or applies an established rule to a novel fact
situation" is one criterion to be considered in "determining whether a decision will be designated
for publication"); 9m CIR. R. 36-2(a) (stating that "[a] written, reasoned disposition shall be
designated as an OPINION only if it: [inter alia] [e]stablishes, alters, modifies, or clarifies a rule
of law"); see also STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 22-23 (proposing the model
rule on which these circuit rules are patterned).
79. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 204 (3d ed. 1990) (Even
in the earliest days of reporting cases, "[t]he rolls continued to be the most authoritative source of
precedents into later times, and it was common for counsel to 'vouch the record' when citing a
previous case.").
80. The Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, Committee on Use of Appellate Court
Energies (the 1973 Committee), drafted a report entitled Standards for Publication of Judicial
Opinions: A Report of the Committee on Use of Appellate Energies of the Advisory Council on
Appellate Justice, which forms the basis for the present federal unpublication system. In that
report, the 1973 Committee proposed issuing some decisions as unpublished and unciteable.
When faced with the question of whether this new class of decisions would be precedent, it chose
not to examine the issue, its constitutionality, or its practicality, calling it a "morass of
jurisprudence." However, removing these decisions from the body of precedent, without ever
reflecting on the jurisprudential impact of doing so causes numerous inequities and significant
confusion. The unclear status of these unpublished opinions in the qualified immunity analysis is
just one of these negative effects on the body of law. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra
note 25, at 20.
81. Though labeled "unpublished opinions," these opinions are published, not only online but
also in printed volumes, such as West's Federal Appendix. This is due in large part to the
continuous use of these opinions by practitioners and judges-despite the opinions' citation
propriety or precedential status. See Cleveland, supra note 25, at 88, 161.
82. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 22-23 (proposing the model rule on
publication which contravened the common law tradition); see also Cleveland, supra note 25, at
84-87 ("[D]eclaring decisions to be unciteable, and moreover, not precedent, was contrary to the
entire history of the common law system.").
83. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 20-21 ("recommend[ing] adoption" of
an alternative delineated "[unpublished] opinions may not be cited to support arguments or
statements of law, i.e., as precedent, and nothing is said about precedential value").
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understood that removing a decision from publication and citation effec-
tively removed it from the body of precedent as well as from view. In
fact, it relied on this "correspondence of publication and precedential
value on the one hand, and of non-publication and non-precedential
value on the other,"" to avoid examining the precedent issue in greater
detail. With the recently approved Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
returning these decisions to the body of citeable law, the correspondence
may work in reverse-once citeable, they must also be treated as prece-
dent. However, that has not yet occurred.8 6
The idea that some cases could be decided by unpublished opinions
was intended as a safety valve to relieve some of the pressure caused by
the volume of cases flowing through the federal courts." The safety
valve has burst; roughly 84% of cases decided by the circuit courts are
decided by unpublished opinions." Federal appellate law is almost
entirely made up of unpublished opinions. The sheer number of unpub-
lished decisions, and the percentage of our appellate law that they make
up, demands a clearer status and also a more equal one.
In the context of the qualified immunity analysis, particularly in
whether they may "clearly establish" the law, there are three aspects of
unpublished opinions that make them particularly suited for this pur-
pose. First, unpublished opinions are supposed to be the easy cases-the
cases that are mere applications of well-settled law to new facts." The
whole notion of an unpublished opinion is based on the idea that some
cases make new law (and should be published) and others merely apply
the existing law to new facts so similar to the old that it does not expand
or contract the law.90 The publication guidelines found in the local rule
or internal operating procedures of most circuits, patterned after the
1973 Committee's recommendation, express this idea: To be unpub-
84. Id. at 21.
85. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a)(i).
86. Compare D.C. CIR. R. 32.1 (opinions rendered by the D.C. Circuit on or after January 1,
2002, may be cited for precedential value) with 8m CIR. R. 32.1A ("Unpublished opinions ... are
not precedent.").
87. See ADMIN. OFF. OF TH4E U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 11 (Mar. 16-17, 1964, U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1964).
88. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 52, tbl.S-3 [hereinafter 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINEsS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/tables/s3.pdf (showing the percentage of unpublished
opinions in the twelve-month period ending September 20, 2006, to be 84.1%).
89. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 1-3 ([In some cases], "[a] simple
order or a brief memorandum may be sufficient to apprise the parties of the result and dispose of
the case."); see also Cleveland, supra note 25, at 110-11 ("If th[e] [law-making versus law-
applying] dichotomy is meaningful, then one would need only to look at the law-making decisions
to know the law and could safely ignore the dispute-resolving cases, which merely apply the law
to other circumstances.").
90. See Cleveland, supra note 25, at 110-11.
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lished, a decision must break no new ground, establish no new rule of
law, and be simply a straightforward application of existing law to
facts.91 For example, the Model Rule on Publication of Judicial Opin-
ions, promoted by the 1973 Committee, was, in pertinent part:
1. Standard for Publication
An opinion of the . .. court .. . shall not be designated for publi-
cation unless:
a. The opinion establishes a new rule or law or alters or modi-
fies an existing rule; or
b. The opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public inter-
est; or
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or
d. The opinion resolves an apparent conflict of authority.
5. All opinions that are not found to satisfy a standard for publica-
tion as prescribed by section (1) of this rule shall be marked, Not
Designated for Publication.92
Circuit court publication standards are generally patterned after this
model rule, though most add some additional considerations.93 Some,
91. 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(1) ("In general, the court thinks it desirable that opinions be published
and thus be available for citation. The policy may be overcome in some situations where an
opinion does not articulate a new rule of law, modify an established rule, apply an established rule
to novel facts or serve otherwise as a significant guide to future litigants."); 4TH CIR. R. 36(a)
(closely paralleling the proposed Model Rule); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 (closely paralleling the
proposed Model Rule); 6TH CIR. R. 206(a) (closely paralleling the proposed Model Rule); 9TH
CIR. R. 36-2(a) (closely paralleling proposed Model Rule); D.C. CiR. R. 36(c)(2) (paralleling the
proposed Model Rule). But see 2D CIR. I.O.P. 32.1.1(a) (stating as a publication guideline only
that "when a decision in a case is unanimous and each panel judge believes that no jurisprudential
purpose is served by an opinion (i.e., a ruling having precedential effect), the panel may rule by
summary order" instead of by opinion); 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (giving guidance limited to "[a]n
opinion, whether signed or per curiam, that appears to have value only to the trial court or the
parties is designated as not precedential and is not printed as a slip opinion but, unless otherwise
provided by the court, it is posted on the court's internet website. A not precedential opinion may
be issued without regard to whether the panel's decision is unanimous and without regard to
whether the panel affirms, reverses, or grants other relief."); 1 TH CIR. R. 36-2 (stating that the
default is not to publish without guidelines for publication, i.e., "[a]n opinion shall be unpublished
unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it.") The Seventh Circuit had a very detailed
publication guideline rule in place prior to the 1973 Committee's Model Rule proposal (Circuit
Rule 28), see STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 29-32, and later adopted the
Committee's recommendation (now rescinded Circuit Rule 53), and now seems to offer no
guidance on what decisions should be published or unpublished. The Eighth Circuit gives no
guidance, but merely states that "[t]he panel determines whether the opinion in the case is to be
published or unpublished." 8TH CIR. I.O.P. IV.B. The Federal Circuit has an entry of affirmance
without opinion rule that speaks not to publication but to the writing of an opinion entirely. FED.
CIR. R. 36.
92. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 22-23.
93. For example, the rule in the Sixth Circuit is, in pertinent part:
(a) Criteria for Publication.
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like the First Circuit's, explicitly state that unpublished opinions are
statements of clearly established law:
In general, the court thinks it desirable that opinions be published and
thus be available for citation. The policy may be overcome in some
situations where an opinion does not articulate a new rule of law,
modify an established rule, apply an established rule to novel facts or
serve otherwise as a significant guide to future litigants.94
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit's rule states, "[d]isposition without [pub-
lished] opinion does not mean that the case is unimportant. It means that
the case does not require application of new points of law that would
make the decision a valuable precedent."9 5 The Fifth Circuit's rule simi-
larly states:
The publication of opinions that merely decide particular cases on the
basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on
the public and burdens on the legal profession. However, opinions
that may in any way interest persons other than the parties to a case
should be published. Therefore, an opinion is published if it:
(b) Applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different
from those in previous published opinions applying the rule.9 6
In short, the law in unpublished opinions is by definition clearly
established; if it were not, the decision would be ineligible for unpub-
lished status. It is a fundamental premise of the concept of unpublished
opinions that they do not make new law but only apply the established
law.9 7 Ignoring unpublished decisions is ignoring the best evidence of
The following criteria shall be considered by panels in determining whether a
decision will be designated for publication in the Federal Reporter:
(1) whether it establishes a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule of
law, or applies an established rule to a novel fact situation;
(2) whether it creates or resolves a conflict of authority either within the circuit or
between this circuit and another;
(3) whether it discusses a legal or factual issue of continuing public interest;
(4) whether it is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion;
(5) whether it reverses the decision below, unless:
(A) the reversal is caused by an intervening change in law or fact, or,
(B) the reversal is a remand (without further comment) to the district court of a
case reversed or remanded by the Supreme Court;
(6) whether it addresses a lower court or administrative agency decision that has
been published; or,
(7) whether it is a decision that has been reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court.
6m CIR. R. 206(a).
94. IST CR. R. 36.0(b)(1).
95. 10TH CIR. R. 36.1.
96. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1.
97. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 1-3 ("[In some cases], a simple order
or a brief memorandum may be sufficient to apprise the parties of the result and dispose of the
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what the clearly established law is.
Second, as applications of clearly established law to additional fac-
tual settings, unpublished opinions provide what the qualified immunity
analysis needs most from prior cases-applications of "extremely
abstract rights" to specific factual settings that provide clear guidance to
government officials about what rights exist and what conduct violates
them." While the Supreme Court has held that the precise conduct at
issue need not have been declared unlawful, the qualified immunity test
does require that the unlawfulness of a defendant's action "be appar-
ent."" In making this determination, additional information about what
conduct has been declared constitutional or unconstitutional provides
both putative plaintiffs and government officials with a better under-
standing of the contours of the federal rights at issue. This is a critical
and exceedingly difficult question in the qualified immunity analysis,"
and it is one which unpublished opinions can help resolve. More opin-
ions applying settled law to differing facts means more factually specific
sources from which government officials can judge the reasonableness
of any given action. Ignoring unpublished decisions is ignoring the most
factually specific evidence of what rights exist and what conduct vio-
lates those rights.
Third, the sheer number of unpublished opinions, and the fact that
they make up the overwhelming majority of federal opinions, suggests
their usefulness in the qualified immunity determination. The qualified
immunity analysis is fundamentally a question of what the law was and
whether the government official had notice of the unlawfulness of his
conduct. 0 1 Because unpublished opinions by definition represent appli-
cations of settled law to facts not novel enough to expand or contract the
case."); see also William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-
Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1167, 1183 (1978) ("[Unpublished] opinions serving only the dispute-settling function have
value only to the parties in the case and the decision-maker below; they have no value to the legal
public at large.").
98. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
99. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); accord Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citation
omitted) ("The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.").
100. BROWN & KINPORTS, supra note 19, at 112 ("In the twenty-five years since Harlow was
decided, the federal courts have never agreed on the extent to which [a] plaintiffs case must be
factually similar to the relevant precedents .... ").
101. In both Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, and United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1997),
the Supreme Court analogized the kind of notice government officials should be given in the
qualified immunity context to the concept of fair notice in the criminal law context, i.e., where a
government official is charged with acting "'willfully' and under color of law to deprive a person
of rights protected by the Constitution" under 18 U.S.C. § 242.
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law, unpublished opinions should be the best data points for putative
plaintiffs, government officials, and courts to use in determining
whether the law was sufficiently clear and whether the alleged conduct
was sufficiently proscribed. 10 2 This body of opinions, which has the two
key characteristics needed to improve the qualified immunity analysis,
should not be omitted. 0 3 Even a few such opinions could aid in deter-
mining what the law was and what it said about the government offi-
cial's conduct, but the fact that such opinions make up 84% of the
federal case law suggests that to decide "clearly established law" in the
absence of such decisions is to be myopic in the extreme. To determine
what law was clearly established without reference to 84% of that law
seems as impossible as determining the picture on a puzzle face with
only 16% of the pieces." Even if those pieces are the most important
ones, it is the aggregate that makes up the full picture. Even if the impor-
tance of the 16% of federal appellate decisions that are published is con-
ceded because they are the only cases changing or establishing the law
in a meaningful way, the other 84% that are unpublished must represent
the applications of settled law. This 84% makes up the bulk of what a
putative plaintiff or government official ought to be concerned with, not
a body of law that should be cast aside. Ignoring unpublished decisions
is ignoring the vast majority of federal case law and viewing the tapestry
of clearly established law from only its most unusual threads.
Unpublished opinions are not only useful in determining what law
is clearly established, they are uniquely situated within the federal law to
do so. The sheer number of applications of settled law to differing, but
102. For example, under Sixth Circuit Rule 206(a) noted above, no decision that: (1)
establishes a new rule of law; (2) alters or modifies an existing rule of law; (3) creates or resolves
a conflict or authority either within the circuit or between this circuit and another; or (4) discusses
a legal or factual issue of continuing public interest, should be unpublished.
103. This is true even if it is agreed that these decisions lack some characteristic, such as
expanding or contracting the law, that genuinely makes them of lesser value than published
opinions. Unpublished decisions, as applications of settled law, make them especially well-suited
to aid in the qualified immunity analysis. That said, there is certainly an argument to be made that
unpublished opinions, like every common law decision, do add to the body of law and ought to be
considered precedent for a whole host of reasons. See generally Cleveland, supra note 25, at 176.
While granting unpublished decisions precedential value is the most straightforward, and most
jurisprudentially sound, way to resolve the muddling of the qualified immunity analysis, this
article takes the federal judiciary's claims about the nature of unpublished opinions at face value
in order to more readily persuade it to use them in qualified immunity analysis.
104. This phenomenon has been described with many metaphors including analogizing the
common law to a "pointillist painting" with each case representing an individual point. See Jon A.
Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why
Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L. REv. 195,
195 (2001). Collectively, a very detailed picture exists, but the more points removed the less clear
the picture becomes, eventually ending in inscrutability. Id. This is consistent with the notions of
Sir Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone that it is not the individual cases that matter but the
aggregate. See Cleveland, supra note 25, at 74-78.
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not too differing, facts, makes them ideal for telling the parties what the
law expects and prohibits. Whether viewed from the perspective of an
injured party, a government official trying to discern the best course of
action, or a reviewing judge assessing whether the law was clearly estab-
lished, more decisions showing the law applied to specific facts is better
than fewer decisions. All parties are better able to judge the reasonable-
ness of a search incident to arrest, for example, if given a dozen cases
evaluating prior searches rather than two. 0 5 Moreover, even if unpub-
lished opinions are not viewed as precedential, and therefore unable to
clearly establish the law themselves, by their very nature they are evi-
dence that law is clearly established.106 Unfortunately, like their treat-
ment of unpublished opinions generally, the federal circuits vary in their
use of unpublished opinions in the qualified immunity analysis. This
muddles the substantive test for qualified immunity.
V. CIRCUIT PRACTICES VARY REGARDING THE USE OF UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS IN CLEARLY ESTABLISHING LAW
The Supreme Court has never spelled out what sources of law may
clearly establish the law, which has left the circuit courts to develop
varying rules. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court left open the
issue of whether lower court decisions may clearly establish the law.107
The Supreme Court has refused to restrict the sources of law that may
clearly establish the law to its own decisions, refusing to adopt "a cate-
gorical rule that decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other courts are
inadequate as a matter of law" to clearly establish the law. 1 s It has like-
wise referred to a variety of opinions, including appellate, district,
unpublished, and state court decisions in examining whether the law was
clearly established. 109 In addition, it has attempted to allay circuit fears
regarding the use of persuasive authority:
[I]n applying the rule of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
105. These numbers were not chosen arbitrarily. Two out of twelve cases represent slightly
more than 16%-the percentage of federal appellate decisions that are actually published
annually. See 2006 JUDICIAL BuSINESS, supra note 88.
106. To argue otherwise would be to admit unpublished opinions are being used to make sui
generis decisions not justified by settled law, an argument that while it has some support, is an
untenable position for the federal judiciary itself to take.
107. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982) ("[W]e need not define here the
circumstances under which 'the state of the law' should be 'evaluated by reference to the opinions
of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court."' (quoting Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978))).
108. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997).
109. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 616 (1999) (examining state appellate,
unpublished federal district, and federal circuit opinions); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 533
(1985) (examining federal district opinions).
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and Bivens . . . , we have referred to decisions of the Courts of
Appeals when enquiring whether a right was "clearly established."
Although the Sixth Circuit was concerned, and rightly so, that dispa-
rate decisions in various Circuits might leave the law insufficiently
certain even on a point widely considered, such a circumstance may
be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough,
without any need for a categorical rule that decisions of the Courts of
Appeals and other courts are inadequate as a matter of law to provide
it.110
Although none of these cases specifically authorizes or rejects a given
source of law in determining what is clearly established, Wilson v. Layne
contains the clearest enunciation of Supreme Court guidance when it
noted that plaintiffs had failed to locate
any cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of
the incident which clearly established the rule on which they seek to
rely, nor have they identified a consensus of cases of persuasive
authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that
his actions were lawful.11 '
Despite this guidance, or perhaps because of its lack of a specific com-
mand about the exact sources to be considered, circuit courts have taken
radically different interpretations of what sources may clearly establish
the law.112
The Supreme Court's own decisions clearly establish the law stated
in them, and the circuits uniformly agree that their own binding deci-
sions apply to qualified immunity cases within their circuit. 1 3 But
whether decisions of sister circuits, unpublished decisions, district court
decisions, or state court decisions, may play a role in clearly establishing
the law varies from circuit to circuit. Given the special nature of unpub-
lished opinions that makes them particularly well-suited to demonstrat-
ing clearly established law, the following survey of the circuits pays
special attention to how the circuits treat those opinions.
A. Circuits that Are Silent on the Issue (1st, 5th, 8th, & D.C.)
Four circuits, the First, Fifth, Eighth, and D.C., are completely
silent on whether unpublished opinions may be used to clearly establish
the law. None have spoken on the issue directly; however, all four take
an expansive view of what sources may clearly establish the law.' 14 In
110. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269 (citations omitted).
11l. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617.
112. See supra note 23.
113. See SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 5, at 472-73.
114. El Dia, Inc. v. Rossello, 165 F.3d 106, 110 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999) (expressing a willingness to
look at decisions of other circuits and evaluating them according to "the location and level of the
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addition, it seems likely that the D.C. and Fifth Circuits would permit
unpublished opinions to be considered given that each has a rule permit-
ting citation and use as precedent of all unpublished opinions issued
before or after a certain date.1 No similar clues exist by which to
divine the stances the First and Eighth Circuits might take." 6
B. Circuits Where Unpublished Opinions Cannot Be Used To Show
Clearly Established Law (4th, 7th, & 11th)
In three circuits, the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh, unpublished
opinions have been soundly rejected as evidence of whether the law was
clearly established."' The Fourth Circuit held, in a trio of cases in the
1990s, that unpublished opinions do not clearly establish the law
because they are not precedent. In Torcasio v. Murray, the plaintiff, a
morbidly obese man, alleged that prison officials violated his rights
precedent, its date, its persuasive force, and its level of factual similarity to the facts before this
Court"); McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (2003)
("[W]e must consider both this court's treatment of the [basis for imposing liability] and status of
this theory in our sister circuits . . . ."); Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the Eight Circuit "subscribe[s] to a broad view of the concept of clearly established
law, and . . . look[s] to all available decisional law, including decisions from other courts, federal
and state, when there is no binding precedent in this circuit"); Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871,
885 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that the D.C. Circuit looks to law outside the circuit when there are
no cases of "controlling authority").
115. D.C. CIR. R. 32.1 ("All unpublished orders or judgments of this court . . . entered on or
after January 1, 2002, may be cited as precedent."); 5m CIR. R. 47.5.3 ("Unpublished opinions
issued before January 1, 1996, are precedent. Although every opinion believed to have
precedential value is published, an unpublished opinion may be cited pursuant to FED. R. APP. P.
32.1(a)."). But see 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 ("Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996,
are not precedent."). But this correlation is not necessarily predictive. Compare 4TH CIR. R.
32.1 (leaving open the possibility that an unpublished opinion may have precedential value) with
Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1996) (denying unpublished opinions any use in
determining clearly established law).
116. One might speculate that they would not consider them given their circuit rules denying
precedent, Local Rule 36.0(a) and Local Rule 32.1A, respectively. However, this direct
correlation of precedent to use in the qualified immunity analysis is belied by the Ninth Circuit,
which was historically the most adverse to according unpublished opinions citation or precedent.
Yet, the Ninth Circuit has traditionally considered unpublished opinions in the qualified immunity
analysis. See Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 714 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "[a]bsent binding
precedent, we look to all available decisional law, including the law of other circuits and district
courts, to determine whether the right was clearly established").
117. See Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 11, 124 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), affd, 526 U.S. 603
(1999) ("[W]e are loathe to cite to unpublished opinions, see Local Rule 36(c), nor will we
consider them to be evidence that a right is or is not clearly established."); Hogan, 85 F.3d at 1118
("Since unpublished opinions are not even regarded as binding precedent in our circuit, such
opinions cannot be considered in deciding whether particular conduct violated clearly established
law for purposes of adjudging entitlement to qualified immunity."); Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d
1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[C]itation of unpublished opinions seems an unusually ineffective,
and even counterproductive, means of demonstrating that a given proposition of law was 'clearly
established."').
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under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by
denying his requests for special prison accommodations."' The Fourth
Circuit harshly disapproved of the plaintiff's citation to unpublished
opinions to prove that the right was clearly established," 9 stating: "We
generally look with disfavor upon citation of unpublished dispositions
. . . as citation of unpublished opinions seems an unusually ineffective,
and even counterproductive, means of demonstrating that a given pro-
position of law was 'clearly established."l 2 0 The Fourth Circuit reiter-
ated this perspective in Hogan v. Carter, in which it stated:
Since unpublished opinions are not even regarded as binding prece-
dent in our circuit, such opinions cannot be considered in deciding
whether particular conduct violated clearly established law for pur-
poses of adjudging entitlement to qualified immunity. We could not
allow liability to be imposed upon public officials based upon unpub-
lished opinions that we ourselves have determined will be binding
only upon the parties immediately before the court.121
Similarly, in Wilson v. Layne, the Fourth Circuit held that unpublished
opinions, as non-precedents, could not be used to clearly establish the
law.' 22 Whether the Circuit has wavered from this highly restrictive rule
after the Supreme Court's review and rejection of a categorical rule
against using non-binding sources is unclear.
The Seventh Circuit also ties the issue of whether unpublished deci-
sions may be used to demonstrate clearly established law to their status
as non-binding precedent.' 2 3 While there is only a single Seventh Circuit
opinion on the issue, albeit predating Wilson v. Layne, it is clear in its
118. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1342.
119. Id. at 1347-48.
120. Id.
121. Hogan, 85 F.3d at 1118.
122. Wilson, 141 F.3d at 124. Actually, the court makes a statement that is frightful in its
implications:
It seems logical that repeated decisions refusing to recognize a right would be
evidence that the right was not clearly established even if the opinions were
unpublished. However, it is well known that judges may put considerably less effort
into opinions that they do not intend to publish. Because these opinions will not be
binding precedent in any court, a judge may be less careful about his legal analysis,
especially when dealing with a novel issue of law. For this reason we are loathe to
cite to unpublished opinions, see Local Rule 36(c), nor will we consider them to be
evidence that a right is or is not clearly established.
Id. at 124 n.6. This comment, in a single footnote, suggests that a majority of Fourth Circuit
judges believed that unpublished opinions were being used to deal with novel issues of law and
perhaps carelessly so.
123. Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Taken together with other
evidence, [unpublished opinions] might show that the law had been clearly established. But by




disapproval of unpublished, non-binding authority as clearly establish-
ing a right. 124 In Anderson v. Romero, the plaintiff was a prison inmate
who became infected with the AIDS virus while confined in a state peni-
tentiary. 125 The plaintiff brought suit against prison officials under sec-
tion 1983, alleging that the prison officials caused him to be put in an
isolated cell and denied him various privileges because of his HIV-posi-
tive status.12 6 In conducting a qualified immunity analysis, the court
stated "that district court decisions cannot clearly establish a constitu-
tional right," reasoning that such decisions "by themselves . . . cannot
clearly establish the law because, while they bind the parties by virtue of
the doctrine of res judicata, they are not authoritative as precedent."12 7
In dicta, the Seventh Circuit applied this reasoning to unpublished deci-
sions of the circuit court, stating, "[t]he unpublished decisions of this
court have no weight as precedent. . . . although we cannot find any
cases on the point, we are confident that an unpublished decision cannot
elevate the decision that it affirms to the status of circuit precedent."m12
Two developments crucial to the use of unpublished opinions have
occurred since the rulings noted above. First, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Wilson v. Layne refused to categorically reject lower court,
unpublished, and persuasive authority as a source of clearly establishing
the law.129 Second, the tide has turned against the wholesale marginal-
ization of unpublished opinions, as evidenced by their universal
citeabilty after Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1.130 Whether
either the Fourth or Seventh Circuit has changed course or will change
course is unknown; at this time, no recent cases address whether they
have changed their practice on the use of unpublished opinions to clearly
establish the law.
Post-Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a very restrictive view of
what types of decisions may be considered in determining clearly estab-
lished law.13 ' In Marsh v. Butler County, county prisoners brought a
124. Id.
125. Id. at 520.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 525.
128. Id.
129. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (suggesting that "a consensus of persuasive
authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful" could
suffice).
130. FED. R. App. P. 32.1 (not allowing the prohibition or restriction of unpublished opinions
issued on or after January 1, 2007).
131. Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1032-33 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to
interpret Wilson v. Layne as requiring consideration of non-binding sources of law or any
"consensus of cases of persuasive authority," and holding that Eleventh Circuit law can be clearly
established only by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and the highest state court for the relevant state).
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claim against the sheriff for injuries they received at the hands of fellow
prisoners.132 In its discussion of how factually similar precedent cases
must be, the court opined that it would look only to decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
and decisions of the highest court of the relevant state."' The Court
rejected any reading of Wilson v. Layne that would permit a "consensus
of cases of persuasive authority" to clearly establish the law. 134 Its rea-
soning for this was that "[e]ach jurisdiction has its own body of law, and
splits between jurisdictions on matters of law are not uncommon."a135
This reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, such splits of authority
would serve to indicate that the law is not clearly established, and the
lack of a split would bolster the case in favor of clearly established law.
Second, when it comes to federally guaranteed civil rights, uniformity
should be seen as a goal, particularly for section 1983 and Bivens
actions, which were intended to give effect to federal rights across the
country.
The Fourth and Seventh Circuit rules regarding the use of unpub-
lished opinions may be different post-Wilson, but there is no case law
yet to indicate that. It is possible that they will follow the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's unabashed restrictive approach, which allows only binding author-
ity to be used in the qualified immunity analysis. For the Eleventh
Circuit's part, unpublished opinions hold no sway in determining
whether the law was clearly established and are unlikely to do so absent
an en banc or Supreme Court mandate.
C. Circuits Where Unpublished Opinions Likely Cannot Be Used To
Show Clearly Established Law (2nd & 10th)
In two circuits, the Second and Tenth, it is most likely that unpub-
lished opinions may not be used to clearly establish the law. 136 While
not as definitive in their rejection of unpublished opinions as the Fourth
or Seventh Circuits, these two circuits have ruled in a manner that casts
132. Id. at 1023. Under Alabama law, the sheriff was responsible "for the jail's general
supervision and control." Id.
133. Id. at 1032-33 n.10.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that "unpublished
opinion[s] . . . provide[ ] little support" for a claim that the law was clearly established); Cerrone
v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138,
144 (2d Cir. 1999) for the proposition that only Supreme Court and binding Second Circuit
authority may be looked to while suggesting that district and unpublished circuit opinions were
not useful); cf Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a Sixth Circuit
unpublished opinion on the grounds that it was not precedential within the Sixth Circuit).
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some doubt on their willingness to look to unpublished opinions in
determining whether the law was clearly established.
The Second Circuit has made only vague statements about its treat-
ment of opinions in the qualified immunity determination. In Cerrone v.
Brown, the court was faced with the question of whether the law requir-
ing probable cause to detain and question a police officer was clearly
established.' The investigating officers claimed that probable cause
was unnecessary because Cerrone was a police officer-a government
employee-and being investigated for conduct related to his employ-
ment.'3 8 The defendants offered an unpublished district court opinion,
which had been affirmed by an unpublished table decision, but the court
found it unavailing, noting via parenthetical that "only Supreme Court
and Second Circuit precedent are relevant to whether a right is clearly
established."'" 9 However, in Tellier v. Fields, a Bivens action decided
one year prior to Cerrone, the Second Circuit did not rule out the use of
unpublished opinions entirely.140 In Tellier, the plaintiff argued that he
was held by federal officials in administrative detention without review
hearings, which violated his constitutional rights.14 ' In an attempt to
demonstrate that this right was not clearly established, the defendants
relied upon many unpublished opinions from "distant circuits."142 While
the court refused to view them as convincing, it did so based on their
distance and lack of relevance rather than their status as unpublished
decisions.' 43 In fact, the court seemed open to the use of non-binding
law, which would include unpublished opinions, as long as they "clearly
foreshadow"' 4 4 a certain ruling, stating, "the absence of a decision by
this court or the Supreme Court directly addressing the right at issue
'will not preclude a finding that the law was clearly established
.... . "14 In the face of these two decisions, neither of which makes a
definitive statement and each of which points in a different direction, it
is difficult to determine the Second Circuit's rule on the use of unpub-
lished opinions in the qualified immunity analysis. Given that the Cer-
rone decision is more recent and more directly confronts the issue, it is
likely that the Second Circuit will not look to unpublished opinions for
clearly established law.
137. Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 196.
138. Id. at 199-200.
139. Id. at 202 (citing Townes, 176 F.3d at 144).
140. Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 86 (2d Cir. 2000) (examining the unpublished decisions in
an effort to distinguish them rather than brushing them off as unpublished).
141. Id. at 74.
142. Id. at 86.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 84 (quoting Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1997)).
145. Id. (quoting Shabazz v. Coughlin, 852 F.2d 697, 701 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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The Tenth Circuit has issued only two opinions from which to draw
a conclusion regarding its treatment of unpublished opinions in the qual-
ified immunity analysis. 1 6 In Mecham v. Frazier, Mecham brought a
section 1983 action alleging that two state troopers used excessive force
during her roadside arrest.' 47 In her attempt to defeat defendants' claim
of qualified immunity, Mecham cited to an unpublished opinion "to sup-
port her position that, at the time of her arrest, the law was clear that the
force used in her case was excessive." 148 After rejecting the decision as
not analogous, the court stated that, even if the facts were analogous,
"[a]n unpublished opinion .. . provides little support for the notion that
the law is clearly established . . . ."149 Of course, the court explicitly
states that unpublished opinions provide little support rather than no
support, which leaves the question of where the Tenth Circuit stands
somewhat open. The Tenth Circuit states a more direct disapproval of
using unpublished opinions to determine clearly established law in
Green v. Post.5 o It does so, however, in a dicta footnote that conflates
circuit court unpublished opinions with district court unpublished opin-
ions.1"' Still, while its refusal to examine unpublished opinions in deter-
mining clearly established law is weakly supported, the footnote is
strongly worded: "In determining whether the law was clearly estab-
lished, we have held that we may not rely upon unpublished deci-
sions."' 5 2 Given this strong language, this is likely to become the Tenth
Circuit's position.153
The Second and Tenth Circuits, though they have spoken since the
Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Layne, have not explicitly followed
that decision's broad acceptance of a wide variety of sources for clearly
establishing the law. While neither circuit has spoken in clear terms,
146. See Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 2009); Mecham v. Frazier, 500
F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007).
147. Mecham, 500 F.3d at 1202.
148. Id. at 1206.
149. Id.
150. Green, 574 F.3d at 1305-06.
151. Id. at 1305 n.10.
152. Id. (citing Medina v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498-99 (10th Cir. 1992))
(noting that an unpublished district court decision may not be relied on to clearly establish the law
"because that ruling was unpublished").
153. This either misunderstands or does not accept the federal judiciary's official conception of
unpublished opinions as containing only applications of settled law evidenced by its own Tenth
Circuit Local Rule 36. 1, which states, "[d]isposition without opinion does not mean that the case
is unimportant. It means that the case does not require application of new points of law that would
make the decision a valuable precedent." lOH CIR. R. 36.1; see also Jordan v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 191 F. App'x 639, 650 (10th Cir. 2006) ("In determining whether an atypical deprivation
occurred, we acknowledge most of our decisions are unpublished, but conclude they lend some
persuasive value on material issues not addressed in a published decision and assist in the
disposition of the issues in this case.").
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both seem to lean toward rejecting, or at least marginalizing, unpub-
lished opinions as a source that may demonstrate clearly established law.
D. Circuits Where Unpublished Opinions Likely Can Be Used To
Show Clearly Established Law (3rd & 6th)
In two circuits, the Third and Sixth, case law seems to allow the use
of unpublished opinions in clearly establishing the law. But, they have
not unambiguously made that the law of the circuit.'5 ' For example, the
Third Circuit has only a single decision dealing with the use of an
unpublished decision to clearly establish the law, and that decision does
not state a clear rule for whether such opinions are usable." Though it
rejects the unpublished opinion proffered by the defendants in that case,
it suggests a broad view of what kind of opinions may be used to clearly
establish the law.1 5 6 In Williams v. Bitner, a Muslim inmate, who was
forced to handle pork as part of his kitchen duties, brought suit against
prison officials claiming a violation of his First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion.' The defendants, claiming that the law in this
regard was not clearly established, offered an unpublished Sixth Circuit
case denying a similar claim.' 8 The Third Circuit stated that this single
unpublished decision did not undermine the weight of authority estab-
lishing the law as clearly established because the Supreme Court and the
three circuits with published opinions had unanimously ruled in favor of
a right similar to that alleged by Williams.'5 9 In doing so, the court
noted that while district court decisions do not establish precedent for
the circuit, "such opinions nonetheless may be relevant to the 'clearly
established' determination."'a Thus, Williams applies a similar expan-
sive reasoning to unpublished opinions, suggesting that the Third Circuit
154. See Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that nonbinding
opinions "nonetheless may be relevant to the 'clearly established' determination"); McCloud v.
Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1555 n.28 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding value in unpublished decisions
specifically because they represent circuit court judgments of how settled law applies to specific
examples). But see Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988)
("[T]o find a clearly established constitutional right, a district court must find binding
precedent.").
155. Williams, 455 F.3d at 193.
156. Id. at 192-93, n.7 (demonstrating a willingness to consider district court opinions and
cases from other circuits).
157. Id. at 187. Williams was "fired from his kitchen job, cited for misconduct, and punished
accordingly." Id. He also brought claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Id.
158. Id. at 193.
159. Id. at 193-94. The basis for the court's rejection of the Sixth Circuit's unpublished
opinion, however, was that unpublished opinions have little or no precedential value in the Sixth
Circuit.
160. Id. at 193 n.7 ("[D]istrict court opinions do play a role in the qualified immunity
analysis." (citing Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 321 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001))).
2010] 71
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
will at least consider them in determining whether the law was clearly
established.161
The Sixth Circuit has a single strong declaration and defense of
using unpublished opinions to determine whether the law is clearly
established,162 but dicta in other cases weaken that strong stance.' 6 3 The
Sixth Circuit opinion in McCloud v. Testa contains the most well-rea-
soned statement by a federal appellate court of why unpublished opin-
ions should be used to determine clearly established law, while other
Sixth Circuit opinions imply that such opinions should not be used
because they are not binding statements of law.I" In McCloud v. Testa,
the plaintiffs, former government employees, brought a section 1983
claim alleging violations of their First Amendment right to be free from
dismissal based on their political affiliation. 165 A critical question in that
case was whether the positions plaintiffs held were the types of jobs for
which political affiliation was a reasonable part of the job qualification
and whether the law was clearly established on that point.166 While nor-
mally dismissal based on political affiliation would violate the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court in Branti v. Finkel carved out an excep-
tion for jobs where political affiliation was a reasonable part of the job
qualification.167 The Sixth Circuit reviewed Supreme Court decisions,
Sixth Circuit published decisions, and a trio of unpublished Sixth Circuit
decisions to determine that the law was clearly established.' 8 Anticipat-
ing that some may view the court's use of unpublished opinions in deter-
mining whether the law was clearly established as "problematic," the
court explained its reason for doing so at length.169 First, the court
explained that because unpublished opinions, by definition, represent the
well-settled law, "cases the court properly decides not to designate for
publication should generally be uncontroversial and establish no new
161. Id. at 193.
162. McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1555 n.28 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[Tjhe use made of
[unpublished] cases here is appropriate for two important reasons. . . . We think . . . that
unpublished opinions, because they show how our court dealt with concrete disputes, are more
persuasive than the purely hypothetical examples we have invented and so merit consideration.").
163. See supra note 154.
164. Compare McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1555 n.28 with Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n v. Seiter,
858 F.2d 171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988) ("to find a clearly established constitutional right, a district
court must find binding precedent") and Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 611 (6th Cir. 2002)
("unpublished cases are not binding precedent. . . . Thus, the unpublished opinions cited in
McLaurin could not have [clearly established the law].").
165. McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1541.
166. Id. at 1546-47.
167. Id. See also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
168. McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1553-55.
169. Id. at 1555 n.28.
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precedent."17 0 Second, the court notes that the unpublished opinions
serve as additional applications of that settled law in a manner that is
very helpful to determine where the case at bar falls into existing law:
The unpublished cases we cite only serve as real-life examples to
demonstrate that some job positions can be situated with relative ease
in relation to the Brand exception. This reinforces the point we make
below at greater length that, in many cases, there need not be an
opinion specifically addressing the job position at issue in a particular
case before it is possible to conclude that this position is clearly
within or outside of the Branti exception."'
The Sixth Circuit panel in McCloud recognized that more data
points make for a clearer, more reliable, and more useful picture of the
state of the law. In addition, the court rejected the notion that the lesser
precedential status of unpublished opinions made them any less suitable
for determining what law was clearly established:
[W]e offer a number of examples below about jobs that can be clearly
positioned in relation to the Branti exception. These citations to
unpublished cases can be considered as having only the same persua-
sive force as the hypothetical examples we have devised. We think,
however, that unpublished opinions, because they show how our
court dealt with concrete disputes, are more persuasive than the
purely hypothetical examples we have invented and so merit
consideration. 172
The court here recognized that whatever precedential value, or lack
thereof, accorded unpublished decisions, they reflect actual judgments
by a panel of the circuit that should be used to judge actions that follow
them.
This well-reasoned decision, and the sensible use of unpublished
opinions it makes, has never been directly contradicted. However, opin-
ions both before and after it have suggested a more restrictive standard.
For example, in Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, the court
seemed to require binding authority,17 1 which unpublished opinions in




173. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir 1988) ("[T]o find a
clearly established constitutional right, a district court must find binding precedent . . . .").
174. See, e.g., Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 611 (6th Cir. 2002) ("It is well-established law in
this circuit that unpublished cases are not binding precedent."); see also Salamalekis v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 221 F.3d 828, 833 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Ernst is not binding precedent because the opinion
is unpublished."); Cattin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 955 F.2d 416, 431 n.14 (6th Cir. 1992)
("Defendants' reliance on our unpublished opinion ... is misplaced. Miller, as unpublished and
not a binding precedent, is clearly distinguishable from this case.").
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the Sixth Circuit stated that a number of unpublished decisions, and a
published decision that cited them, were contrary to the great weight of
published authority and therefore ineffective in clearly establishing the
law.175 While this decision is clear that unpublished opinions are insuffi-
cient in the face of clearly established published law to the contrary, the
implication is made that because they are not precedent, they cannot
clearly establish the law.' 7 6 Despite these opinions implying otherwise,
the Sixth Circuit seems to permit the use of unpublished opinions in
determining clearly established law."'
While neither the Third nor Sixth Circuit has the most unequivocal
position on the use of unpublished opinions in this context, it seems
most likely that each permits, and will continue to permit, citation to
unpublished opinions as part of the analysis.
E. The Circuit Where Unpublished Opinions Can Be Used To Show
Clearly Established Law (9th)
Only the Ninth Circuit has unequivocally stated a willingness to
use unpublished opinions to assess whether the law was clearly estab-
lished." The Ninth Circuit follows an expansive approach to determin-
ing clearly established law, which includes reference to "all decisional
law" including unpublished circuit and district court opinions. 179 This
approach gives maximum guidance to parties and courts about what the
law is and allows a reviewing court to make a fully informed determina-
tion about what the law was at the time of the alleged conduct. In Prison
Legal News v. Cook, the Ninth Circuit reviewed two unpublished district
court opinions in determining whether a prison regulation violated
clearly established law. 80 The plaintiffs, Prison Legal News ("PLN")
175. Bell, 308 F.3d at 611 ("[T]he unpublished cases cited in McLaurin could not have
provided any assurance to a reasonable official ... particularly in light of clear published authority
to the contrary.").
176. Id.
177. This is consistent with the Sixth Circuit's willingness to look at other persuasive
authority, such as the law of other circuits, in determining whether the law is clearly established.
See Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) ("In
inquiring whether a constitutional right is clearly established, we must 'look first to decisions of
the Supreme Court, then to decisions of this court and other courts within our circuit, and finally
to decisions of other circuits."').
178. See Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 701-02 (9th Cir. 2005) ("In
determining whether PLN's rights in this case were clearly established . . . we may look at
unpublished decisions and the law of other circuits, in addition to Ninth Circuit precedent.");
Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[U]npublished decisions of district courts
may inform our qualified immunity analysis.").
179. Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 714 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "[a]bsent binding
precedent, we look to all available decisional law, including the law of other circuits and district
courts, to determine whether the right was clearly established").
180. Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2001).
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and prisoners who subscribed to its newsletter, challenged a prison regu-
lation restricting prisoners' receipt of PLN's non-profit subscription
newsletter.' 8 As part of its analysis of the clearly established law, the
court looked at two unpublished opinions approving of the prison pol-
icy.182 This practice was later reaffirmed and more explicitly included
all unpublished opinions in Prison Legal News v. Lehman.'83 In Leh-
man, the court noted that, "[iun determining whether PLN's rights in this
case were clearly established . . . we may look at unpublished decisions
and the law of other circuits, in addition to Ninth Circuit precedent."' 84
The Ninth Circuit repeatedly approved of this use of all decisional law,
including unpublished opinions, in determining clearly established
law,'8 and unlike the Sixth Circuit, there are no restrictive cases to cast
doubt on the Circuit's view of the issue. Indeed, evidence suggests that
government officials in the Ninth Circuit look to unpublished opinions,
in addition to published ones, in setting policy to avoid infringing
others' constitutional rights.'8 6 In Bahrampour v. Lampert, Oregon
Department of Corrections ("ODC") officials argued to the trial court
that their conduct was reasonable and that they were entitled to qualified
immunity in part because they had looked to the Ninth Circuit's unpub-
lished opinions on the issue in crafting prison regulations. The court
stated: "The district court determined that in forming its regulations,
ODC properly relied on unpublished opinions, despite their lack of bind-
ing precedential effect. ODC argues before this Court that unpublished
decisions can be considered in determining whether the law was clearly
established. We agree."18 7
Prior to the passage of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1,
the Ninth Circuit was perhaps the most restrictive regarding citation and
use of unpublished opinions,' 88 yet it has been nearly alone in its care-
181. Id. at 1146-48.
182. Id. at 1152 ("Although unpublished decisions carry no precedential weight, Department
Officials may have relied on these decisions to inform their views on whether the regulation was
valid and whether enforcing it would be lawful.").
183. Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2003) ("A court
may consider unpublished opinions in the qualified immunity analysis"), affd, 397 F.3d 692 (9th
Cir. 2005).
184. Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 701-02 (9th Cir. 2005).
185. See Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 775 (9th Cir. 2009); Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d
705, 714 (9th Cir. 2007); Lehman, 397 F.3d at 701-02; Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969,
977 (9th Cir. 2004); Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003); Sorrels
v. McKee, 390 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2002); Cook, 238 F.3d at 1152.
186. Bahrampour, 356 F.3d at 977 (approving of Oregon Department of Corrections' use of
unpublished opinions to guide their understanding of clearly established law); Cook, 238 F.3d at
1152.
187. Bahrampour, 356 F.3d at 977.
188. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (on an order to show
cause why counsel should not be disciplined for citing to an unpublished opinion contrary to then
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fully reasoned distinction between precedential value and utility in dem-
onstrating clearly established law.
VI. CONCLUSION: UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS SHOULD BE USED IN
DETERMINING THE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW
Unpublished opinions should be used to determine if the law is
clearly established. This is true whether or not they are accorded any
precedential status. If unpublished opinions are merely applications of
well-settled law to facts that do not require any expansion or retraction
of the scope of law, then they are ideal sources for determining what law
is clearly established in the "fact-specific" manner called for by the
qualified immunity test.'" Unpublished decisions are by definition
applications of settled law; they apply that law to factual settings that
again, by virtue of qualifying for an unpublished opinion, are routine
rather than questionable. Finally, the volume of unpublished opinions
means that they can provide additional data for all parties to judge their
conduct that is simply unavailable from the relatively small number of
published opinions.
In addition to these reasons, which follow from the very nature of
unpublished decisions, there are other reasons for a uniform rule requir-
ing the use of unpublished opinions in clearly establishing the law. First,
drawing only from the relatively small number of published decisions
means that the contours of the rights and government officials' knowl-
edge of the lawfulness of their conduct are less clear. Fewer cases yield
fewer applications of the law, which means a greater level of abstraction
and less certainty about the scope of constitutional rights. This area of
law in particular would benefit from greater certainty. Second, variation
among circuits may lead to varying civil rights and qualified immunity
protections depending upon the level of abstraction at which these rights
are viewed. This variation works a particular hardship on the organiza-
tions of government officials that operate across multiple circuits, such
as the Federal Bureau of Prisons, because they are subject to differing
standards-and in many circuits cannot even know what sources of law
local rule 36-3 forbidding citation of such opinions). The Ninth Circuit was also the most vocally
opposed to the adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 liberalizing citation of
unpublished opinions. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und
Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1451 (2005)
(citations omitted) ("80% of the comments opposing Rule 32.1-came from judges, clerks,
lawyers, and others who work or formerly worked in the Ninth Circuit.... Obviously, there had
been an organized campaign to generate comments opposing Rule 32.1, as many of those
comments repeated-sometimes word-for-word-the same basic 'talking points' that had been
distributed by opponents of the rule.").
189. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
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may be setting those standards.19 0 Finally, while the bulk of this article
proceeds from the premise that unpublished opinions are what the fed-
eral judiciary officially says they are-routine applications of settled
law to facts not worthy even of published opinion and therefore not pre-
cedent-the better view, argued for at length elsewhere,' 91 is that
unpublished opinions are precedential, in which case they ought to be
treated like any other decision of the circuit and made part of the quali-
fied immunity analysis.
The uncertain status to which unpublished opinions have been rele-
gated needlessly muddles the qualified immunity analysis. If these deci-
sions were granted precedential status, which they should be based on
common law principles, common legal conceptions, and the Constitu-
tion,192 this detrimental uncertainty would end.193 Even if unpublished
opinions are not granted such status, their very nature makes them the
ideal tool for determining what the clearly established law is and how it
has been applied. As noted by McCloud v. Testa and numerous Ninth
Circuit decisions, even if one views non-precedential unpublished opin-
ions as lacking the imprimatur of the circuit court sufficiently to clearly
establish the law themselves, they are, by meeting the circuit guidelines
for being unpublished, evidence of well-settled law.194 A uniform rule
should be adopted by the Supreme Court that clarifies the place of
unpublished opinions within the qualified immunity test.
190. See generally Catlett, supra note 33, at 1052-53 ("[A] federal official's chances of facing
liability should not increase or decrease based on the locality in which his actions took place.").
191. Cleveland, supra note 25, at 106-73.
192. Id. at 129-62.
193. Though uncertainty of another kind, whether the "consensus of cases of persuasive
authority" stated by Wilson v. Layne is mandatory, or entirely optional, as the Eleventh Circuit
believes, would remain and should also be resolved. See generally Catlett, supra note 33, at 1062;
Stemerman, supra note 33, at 1250.
194. And if they are not well-settled law applied to facts that neither expand nor contract the
law, but rather, misstatements, misapplications, expansions, or contractions of the law, the
American federal justice system has significant problems far beyond the ambiguity in the qualified
immunity analysis.
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